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New financial intermediary development indicators for developing 
countries
Abstract
Financial development indicators are often applied to countries/regions without taking 
into account  specific  financial  development realities.  Financial  depth in the perspective of 
monetary base is  not equal  to liquid liabilities  in every development  context.   This paper 
introduces  complementary indicators  to  the  existing Financial  Development  and Structure 
Database (FDSD). These new measures can easily be computed from the FDSD. We present 
absolute as well as relative measures which are robust to the finance-growth nexus.  When all 
financial sectors are taken into account in the definition and usage of liquid liabilities: (1) the 
formal and non-formal/informal financial  sectors are inherently mutually antagonistic  and 
should  not  be  assimilated  to  the  monetary  base without  distinction;   (2)  equating  formal 
banking sector liquid liabilities to monetary base significantly undermines the formal banking 
system elasticity of growth; (3) there is a trade-off between growth and welfare from one 
financial  sector  to  another;  (4) non-formal  and informal  financial  sectors  are  independent 
significant growth determinants.
JEL Classification: E00; E26
Keywords: Finance; Development; Formalization, Panel, Developing Countries
2
1. Motivation
Financial  development indicators have been universally applied without taking into 
account regional/country specific financial development needs and realities. Usage of some 
indicators for instance is based on the presumption that they are generally valid (Gries et al., 
2009)1; not withstanding empirical evidence that not all indicators may matter in financial 
development (Asongu, 2010a).  Furthermore the absence of a consensus on the superiority of 
financial development indicators; especially the widely used proxy for financial depth (Gries 
et al., 2009) is desirous of research attention.   As far as we have perused related literature, we 
suppose that the absence of any study that focuses on the quality of financial development 
indicators with respect to contextual development concerns is enough inspiration to search for 
the missing link. It is therefore our objective in this paper to verify the validity of the financial 
depth indicator as applied to developing countries and hence decompose it to new measures 
that best address financial development challenges in developing countries. The underlying 
impetus of our study is the misleading assumption that liquid liabilities can be proxied by the 
monetary base (financial  depth) in developing countries. Our study could be interesting to 
policy makers  and researchers  because,  the absence of  sound fundamentals  in  a  financial 
indicator might bias estimations and result in unhealthy policy recommendations. The paper 
will  be structured in the following manner:   section  two examines  related  literature;  new 
indicators are proposed in section three; data and methodology are presented and outlined 
respectively in section four; section five focuses on empirical analysis; we conclude in section 
six. 
1 Gries et al. (2003) state: “In the related literature several proxies for financial deepening have been suggested,  
for example, monetary aggregates such as M2 on GDP. To date there is no consensus on the on the superiority of  
any indicator” (page 1851). 
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2. Related Literature
 2.1 Monetary base as a biased indicator of liquid liabilities in developing countries
2.1.1 Theoretical basis
Liquid  liabilities  expressed  in  terms  of  monetary  base  are  without  distinction  of 
financial  sectors  and rest  on  the  assumption  that  almost  all  currency held  is  linked  to  a 
financial  sector  deposit.  Beck  et  al.,  (1999)  on  presenting  a  new  database  on  financial 
development and structure pointed-out: “Since many researchers have focused on the liability 
side of the balance sheet, we include a measure of absolute size based on liabilities. Liquid 
liabilities to GDP equal currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and 
other financial  intermediaries  divided by GDP. This  is  the broadest  available  indicator  of 
financial  intermediation,  since  it  includes  all  three  financial  sectors....Liquid  liability  is  a 
typical measure of financial depth  and thus the overall size of the financial sector without 
distinguishing  between  financial  sectors  of  the  use  of  liabilities”(page  11).  It  is  worth 
emphasizing  that  almost  no distinction  is  made between different  financial  sectors  in  the 
FDSD; and the hypothesis of all constituents of the monetary base linked to the liability side 
of the balance sheet is questionable for developing countries. Almost all currency held for 
transaction  motives  in  developed  countries  are  still  recycled  in  banks2.  However,  this  is 
subject to controversy in the underdeveloped world and therefore distinction between formal, 
non-formal and informal banking sectors is imperative. 
A bias  in  the definition  of  financial  system deposits  (aka liquid  liabilities)  by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is deserving of examination. According to International 
Financial  Statistics  (hence IFS),  the financial  system is made up of the formal  and semi-
formal (non-formal) sectors; that is deposit money banks and other financial institutions (see 
lines  24,  25 and 45 of  IFS,  October  2008).  While  this  definition  could be  quasi-true for 
developed countries, it fails to take account of the informal financial sector in developing and 
2 Bank deposits are liquid liabilities. 
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underdeveloped countries. This leaves us with some concern over the role of the informal 
sector in financial intermediary development and growth.
2.1.2 Empirical framework
Though the monetary base (M2/GDP) which represents  the money stock has  been 
widely used as a standard measure of liquid liabilities in many studies (World, 1989; King 
and Levine, 1993), in developing countries a large part of the monetary base stock consists of 
currency held outside banks. As such, an improvement in the M2/GDP ratio may reflect an 
extensive use of currency rather than an increase in bank deposits. In an attempt to curtail this 
shortcoming, Demetriades and Hussein (1996) suggested the subtraction of currency outside 
banks from M2 in the measure of liquidity liabilities in developing countries. Abu-Bader and 
Abu-Qarn (2008) amongst others have recently adjusted M2 in like manner. 
Some authors have sought to address the issue by determining a broad variable that is 
indicative  of  financial  depth.  They  use  the  first  principal  component  of  M2/GDP and  a 
combination of one or more financial indicators (Khumbhakar and Mavrotas, 2005; Ang and 
McKibbin, 2007). By so doing they decrease the dimensionality of the set of variables without 
losing much information on the one hand; and on the other hand decrease problems related to 
the quality of M2 as a measure of liquid liabilities.   
Despite the partial awareness of this challenge, literature is inundated with works on 
financial development in developing countries that do not distinguish between components in 
M2 held by banks and currency held outside of the formal financial sector. We argue that 
probing the distinction between formal,  non-formal and informal banking sectors could be 
interesting in mastering the finance-growth nexus. 
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2.2 Why the concept of financial intermediary formalization is crucial in economic 
development?
In Africa,  on average less than 20% of households have access to formal financial 
services3.  The  issue  is  further  evident  with  low  population  densities,  poor  transport  and 
limited communications infrastructure;  which inhibit  formal financial  intermediation.  Even 
where  such  services  are  available,  small  and  medium  size  businesses,  and  low  income 
individuals  could  find  it  difficult  meeting-up  with  eligibility  criteria  such  as  strict 
documentation  requirements  and/or  collaterals.  Beside  constraints  of  physical  access  and 
eligibility,  cost  barrier  in  the  form  of  high  transaction  fees  or  considerable  minimum 
requirements for savings balances or loan amounts present another stumbling block. 
2.2.1 Distinction between formal, non-formal and informal financial intermediaries
Firstly,  formal finance refers to services that are regulated by the central bank and 
other supervisory authorities. Secondly,  non-formal or semi-formal finance is a distinction 
between  formal  and  informal  finance.  This  is  finance  that  occurs  in  a  formal  financial 
environment but not formally recognized. An eloquent example is micro-finance.  Thirdly, 
informal  finance is  one that  is  not  arranged through formal  agreements  and not  enforced 
through the  legal  system.  The last  two types  of  saving and lending are very common in 
developing countries, particularly among the financially excluded or those on low incomes. 
Table 1 inspired by Steel (2006) clearly expatiates the role of non-formal and informal 
banks in the financial system of developing countries. Therefore, the role of Credit Unions 
and Micro Finance NGOs (non-formal finance) as well as elements of the last category cannot 
be undermined in the finance-led-growth nexus: such is the goal of our paper. 
3 Making Finance work for Africa : http://www.mfw4a.org/access-to-finance/access-to-finance.html 
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Table 1: Segments of the financial system by degree of formality in Paper’s context 
Paper’s context Tiers Definitions Institutions Principal Clients
Formal 
Financial sector 
(Deposit Banks)
Formal banks
 
Licensed by 
central bank
Commercial and 
development 
banks 
Large businesses, 
Government
Non-formal 
financial sector
(Other Financial 
Institutions)
Specialized non-
bank financial 
institutions
Rural banks, 
Post banks, 
Saving and 
Loan 
Companies, 
Deposit taking 
Micro Finance 
banks 
Large rural 
enterprises, 
Salaried Workers, 
Small and 
medium 
enterprises 
Semi-formal 
banks
Legally 
registered but 
not licensed as 
financial 
institution by 
central bank and 
government 
Credit Unions, 
Micro Finance 
NGOs
Microenterprises, 
Entrepreneurial 
poor
Informal 
financial sector 
Informal banks
Not legally 
registered at 
national 
level(though 
may be linked 
to a registered 
association)
Savings 
collectors, 
Savings and 
credit 
associations, 
Money lenders
Self-employed 
poor
Source (author)
 
2.2.2  Imperative  of  decomposing  financial  depth  into  formal,  non-formal  and  informal  
components in financial intermediary development.
Hitherto,  from a general macroeconomic perspective,  the imperative of specifically 
determining the role of non-formal and informal banks in financial intermediary development 
has been marginal. We argue that stopping short of this would be gross injustice to the two 
later categories (see table 1) which represent quite a significant part of the financial sector in 
developing countries.  The spirit  of decomposing financial  depth into essential  constituents 
could be expressed in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The IMF definition of the financial system is limited to the formal and semi-
formal (non-formal) sectors; that is deposits money banks and other financial institutions (see 
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lines 24, 25 and 45 of International Financial Statistics, October 2008). While this could be 
quasi  true  for  developed  countries,  this  definition  holds  less  ground  in  developing  and 
underdeveloped  worlds  where,  the  informal  financial  sector  takes  a  toll  on  the  financial 
system and plays an important role in economic growth and development. 
Hypothesis 2: Contrary to mainstream literature, in developing countries money in circulation 
plus transaction and account deposits (M2) is not equal to liquid liabilities. This suggests that, 
equating financial depth to liquid liabilities would be synonymous to assuming the inexistence 
and/or  insignificance  of  non-formal  and  informal  financial  sectors.  Money  in  circulation 
withheld by the informal and non-formal financial sectors does not always transit through the 
banking system. Therefore such currency cannot be considered as formal bank sector deposits 
or liquid liabilities.   
Hypothesis  3: Less than 20% of population in some developing countries (e.g. Africa) has 
access  to  the  formal  banking  system4.  This  further  strengthens  hypothesis  1.  In  effect, 
sidelining the role of majority of the population in financial development is gross bias. 
Hypothesis  4:  The  informal  and  non-formal  financial  sectors  are  statistically  significant 
contributions  to  M2 and economic  growth.  We shall  endeavor  to  substantiate  this  in  the 
empirical side of this paper.
  
Hypothesis  5:  Understanding  competition  between  afore  three  forms  of  financial 
intermediation through relative measures in the context of hypothesis 15 could provide more 
insight in the finance-growth nexus. To put this in other terms, the need to evaluate how one 
4 Access  to  Finance  in  Making Finance  work for  Africa:  http://www.mfw4a.org/access-to-finance/access-to-
finance.html
5 Liquidity liability in the context of Hypothesis one equals transaction (demand) and account (time) deposits.  
We emphasis that liquidity liability should not be only measured in absolute terms (that is divided by GDP), it  
should also be appreciated relatively to other components of the monetary base. 
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financial sector develops at the expense of another and vice-versa could be crucial in orienting 
policy-making. 
Above hypotheses (with exclusive respect to components of M2) inspire propositions 
based on absolute and relative measures of financial intermediary development.   
3. Proposition of new indicators 
3.1 Absolute Measures
3.1.1 Formal financial development
Proposition 1: Formal financial development could be defined as:
GDP
depositsBankop _1.Pr =
Bank deposits6  here refer to demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks. 
3.1.2 Non-formal financial development
Proposition 2: Non-formal financial development could be appreciated as:
GDP
depositsBankdepositsFinancialop __2.Pr −=
Financial deposits7 are demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions. 
3.1.3 Informal financial development 
Proposition 3: Informal financial development can be conceived as:
GDP
depositsFinancialMBaseMonetaryop _)2(_3.Pr −=
3.1.4 Informal and non-formal financial development
Proposition 4: Informal and non-formal financial development can be defined as:
6 Lines 24 and 25 of International Financial Statistics (IFS); October 2008. 
7 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October, 2008. 
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GDP
depositsBankMBaseMonetaryop _)2(_4.Pr −=
3.2 Relative Measures
3.2.1 Financial intermediary formalization 
Proposition  5:  From  ‘informal  and  non-formal’  to  formal financial  development 
(formalization) 
)2(_
_5.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsBankop =
In undeveloped countries M2 is not equal to liquid liabilities (liquid liabilities equal bank 
deposits: bd). Whereas in undeveloped countries bd/M2<1, in developed countries bd/M2 is 
almost equal to 1.  This indicator measures the rate at which money in circulation is absorbed 
by the banking system. Financial development here is defined as the propensity of the formal 
banking system to absorb money in circulation. 
3.2.2 Financial intermediary ‘non-formalization’
Proposition  6:  From  ‘informal  and  formal’  to  non-formal financial  development  (Non-
formalization)
)2(_
__6.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsBankdepositsFinancialop −=
This indicator measures the level at which the non-formal financial sector evolves to 
the detriment of formal and informal sectors. 
3.2.3 Financial intermediary ‘informalization’ 
Proposition  7:  From  ‘formal  and  non-formal’  to  informal financial  development 
(Informalisation)
)2(_
_)2(_7.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsFinancialMBaseMonetaryop −=
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This proposition shows the rate at which the informal financial sector is developing at 
the cost of formal and non-formal sectors.
3.2.4 Financial intermediary ‘semi-informalization/non-formalization’ 
Proposition  8:  Formal  to  ‘informal  and  non-formal’  financial  development:  (Semi-
informalisation or semi-non-formalization) 
)2(_
_)2(_8.Pr
MBaseMonetary
depositsBankMBaseMonetaryop −=
The  proposition  appreciates  the  deterioration  of  the  formal  banking  sector  to  the 
benefit of other sectors (informal and non-formal) 
3.2.5 Linkages between absolute measures, financial depth and liquid liabilities 
Liquid liabilities are  equal to the Monetary base (M2) in developing countries only 
when all three sectors of finance are considered: 
Proposition 9: Liquid liabilities = M2;      if and only if:
3.Pr2.Pr1.Pr)2(_ opopopMsliabilitieLiquid ++=
Hence the empirical side of this work based on the equation of M2 to liquid liabilities.
4. Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
Since this paper is methodological oriented, justification of a broad database in the 
choice of data is not much of a constraint.  African Development Indicators (ADI) of the 
World Bank and the Financial  Development and Structure Database (FDSD) are our main 
data  sources.  We limit  ourselves  to  developing  countries  of  the  Economic  and Monetary 
Union of Central African States (CEMAC). Due to   data unavailability, our panel is made up 
of Cameroon, Gabon and Congo Republic spanning from 1990 to 2008. Selected variables 
from ADI include: GDP per capita growth, GDP growth (Dependent and control variables), 
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and  Exports  on  GDP  (complementary  independent  variable).  Remaining  independent 
variables (Propositions from section 3) originate from transformations in the FDSD. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Correlation Analysis 
We perform two types of correlation analysis. The first as presented on table 2 aims to  
investigate if suggested propositions are exogenous to M2. Results show all propositions are 
significant determinants of M2 and therefore could be paramount in the finance-growth nexus. 
The second in the appendix shapes our expectations  on the linkages  between growth and 
propositions on the one hand; and on the other hand, enable plausible model specifications in 
a bid to avoid problems linked to multicolinearity and overparametization. 
Table 2: Correlation analysis between financial depth (M2) and Propositions 
Props Prop. 1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8
C. Coef 0.85*** -0.32** 0.26* 0.24* 0.29** -0.32** -0.27** -0.29**
t-stats 11.69 -2.47 1.95 1.81 2.19 -2.43 -2.06 -2.19
C.Coef: Correlation coefficient. Props: propositions. t-stats: student statistics. *,**,***; significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
4.2.2 Unit root tests
Since we seek to employ a model that assumes a particular functional distribution in 
data analysis, we begin by investigating the stationary properties of our variables at level8 and 
first  difference9.  Among existing  panel  unit  root  tests  we prefer  the first  generation(cross 
sectional  independence)  to  the second generation(cross  sectional  dependence)  because the 
number of periods in each cross section is superior to the number to cross sections(T>N).10 
Among existing first generational tests, we opt for Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC, 2002) and Im, 
Pesaran  and  Shin  (IPS,  2003)  for  homogenous  and  heterogeneous  tests  respectively.  
Borrowing from Asongu (2011) and Khim (2004) we specify both the LLC and IPS tests by 
8 I (0): stationary or absence of unit root at level series.
9 I (1): stationary at first difference or first order integration. 
10 Cross section dependence tests can only be applied when the number of cross sections(N) exceed  the number 
of periods (T).
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Akaike  Information  Criterion  (AIC)11.  Maddala  and  Wu  (1999)  shape  our  decisions  on 
integration properties in event of a conflict of interest between LLC and IPS tests12. Table 3 
shows stationary properties of variables in bold. 
          Table 3: Homogenous and heterogeneous panel unit root tests
Variables
Homogenous(LLC) tests Heterogeneous(IPS) tests
Level First difference Level First difference
c ct c ct c ct c ct
Prop(1) 2.92 1.65 -0.00 -4.90*** 1.52 3.43 0.17 -3.15***
Prop(2) v.s v.s n.a n.a v.s v.s n.a n.a
Prop(3) -1.81** -0.81 n.a n.a -2.63*** -1.52* n.a n.a
Prop(4) -1.66** -0.79 n.a n.a -2.57*** -1.49* n.a n.a
Prop(5) -1.22 -1.74** -6.29*** -5.82*** -1.76** -2.64*** n.a n.a
Prop(6) v.s v.s n.a n.a v.s v.s n.a n.a
Prop(7) -2.15** 2.46 25.70 -2.66*** -1.65** 1.29 8.09 -1.47*
Prop(8) -1.95** 1.86 2.20 -2.58*** -1.51* 1.15 0.25 -1.49*
LL(M2) 0.56 0.78 -1.47* -4.19*** 0.27 2.49 -1.00 -2.86***
Xgdp -2.42*** -3.03*** n.a n.a -1.57* -1.42* n.a n.a
GDPg -8.52*** -6.84*** n.a n.a -7.20*** -6.18*** n.a n.a
GDPpcg -6.70*** -6.89*** n.a n.a -6.94*** -6.12*** n.a n.a
*, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Optimal lag selection is governed by AIC. Maximum lags applied are 3. ‘c’ 
and ‘ct’: ‘constant’ and ‘constant and trend’ ;respectively. n.a: not applicable v.s: visual stationary. Stationary series are in bold and decision 
rule depends on both tests but priority is given the IPS in case of conflict of interest. LLC; Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). IPS: Im, Pesaran and  
Shin (2003). Xgdp: Exports on GDP. LL: Liquid liabilities on GDP. GDPg: GDP growth rate. GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth rate. Prop 
(h): Propositions. 
4.2.3 Model specification tests
Following Asongu (2010b) we opt for Generalized Least Squares (GLS) with Fixed 
Effects (FE) and do not perform the Hausman test to determine if regressions would be by 
Fixed Effects or Random Effects13 . FE regressions also have the advantage of taking into 
account  unobserved heterogeneity and does  not  rest  on the assumption  of the  absence  of 
correlation between the variables and the error term. Upon regression, we justify our choice of 
GLS instead of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with a Wald statistics for heteroscedasticity. 
11 Panel observations are less than 60. With respect to Khim (2004), optimal lag selection for goodness of fit is 
best with AIC or Final Prediction Error (FPE) when observations are less than 60.  
12 According to Maddala and Wu (1999), the alternative hypothesis (for the absence of a common unit) of Levin, 
Lin and Chu (LLC) test is too strong. Following Asongu (2011) we based our decisions on results of IPS test in  
case of conflict of interest.  
13 A priori, the Fixed Effect regression is plausible as cross sections are member states of a given economic and  
monetary region that are not randomly selected. 
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4.2.4 Model formulation
Models (1) and (2) are based on the finance-led-growth nexus. The later checks the 
former and “t” ranges from 1990 to 2008 for each cross section.   
+= 0γitGDPg +itX1γ +ithop )(Pr2γ +itGDPpcg3γ itε                 (1)
For robustness check
 += 0γitGDPpcg +itX1γ +ithop )(Pr2γ +itGDPg3γ itε               (2)
Where; X, Prop, GDPpcg and GDPg represent Exports, Propositions, GDP per capita growth 
and GDP growth respectively. 
             Above models are replicated for propositions 1 to 8.  For proposed parameters that  
fail  to  significantly  explain  the  dependent  variable,  transmission  mechanism  models  are 
applied to verify their effect on growth via M2(propositions two, three, four and six),
4.2.5 Transmission mechanisms 
+= 0γitLL +itX1γ +ithop )(Pr2γ +itGDPpcg3γ itε                       (3)
Robustness tests 
+= 0γitLL +itX1γ +ithop )(Pr2γ +itGDPg3γ itε                           (4)
 Where;  LL,  X,  Prop,  GDPpcg  and  GDPg  denote  Liquid  liabilities  or  M2,  Exports, 
Propositions, GDP per capita growth and GDP growth respectively.  We verify the validity of 
M2 as a transmission channel in the finance-led-growth nexus for each proposition. The later 
equation (4) checks the former (3) with “t” ranging from 1990 to 2008 for each cross section.
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5. Empirical Results
Results  from the first part of table 4 empirically justify Propositions 1, 5, 7, 8 with 
respect  to  the  finance-led-welfare  nexus.  These  findings  are  robust  to  finance-led-growth 
nexus on the second part of the table. As concerns the third section, with regard to M2 as a 
transmission  channel,  Propositions  2,  3,  4  and  6  are  equally  valid  with  respect  to  afore 
nexuses. The Fisher and Wald statistics for respectively the significance of overall model and 
justification  of  the  use of  GLS are  significant  for  all  regressions.  Explanatory  powers  of 
estimated  parameters  expressed  by  the  adjusted  coefficient  of  regression  (Adj.R²)  are 
impressive.
  
5.1 Opposing financial sectors in the financial system 
First and foremost, results of correlations analysis from table 2 seem to suggest non-
formal financial development (Prop.2), financial non-formalization (prop.6), informalisation 
(prop.7) and semi-informalisation (prop.8) are negatively correlated with the monetary base 
(M2); which preliminarily suggest formal financial intermediary development and financial 
formalization should be prioritized when policy seeks to  improve  M2 . Put in other terms, 
there  is  a  significant  antagonism  between  banking  formalization  and  non-
formalization/informalisation; suggesting deposits held by the banking sector (at the expense 
of other sectors) are more favorable to a positive monetary base (M2) than those held by non-
banking sectors (at the expense of the banking sector), everything being equal. However, the 
rationale for using non-formal and informal finance indicators could be perceived in the trade-
off between welfare and growth in the finance-growth nexus. 
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       Table 4: Regression results
Initial models with Propositions: Prop(h)….(Equation 1)
LL(M2)° Prop (1)° Prop(2) Prop(3) Prop(4) Prop(5) Prop(6) Prop(7) Prop(8)
constant 3.29*** 3.26*** 3.51*** 3.43*** 3.43*** 5.83*** 3.39*** 2.85*** 2.85***
11.76 11.70 12.73 11.26 11.28 4.92 12.36 7.13 7.12
Exports -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02***
-3.13 -3.05 -3.96 -4.39 -4.39 -4.57 -3.44 -4.58 -4.57
Prop(h) --- -8.50** -299.49 3.08 3.04 -2.97** -79.99 2.97** 2.97**
--- -2.40 -1.04 1.01 1.00 -2.03 -1.23 2.05 2.03
M2(LL) -6.29** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
-2.27 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
GDPpcg 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1,01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01***
66.99 67.77 70.75 70.63 70.61 73.07 71.34 73.11 73.07
Hetero 23,09*** 20.90*** 25.72*** 28.61*** 28.54*** 21.84*** 26.05*** 21.99*** 21.84***
Adj. R² 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Fisher 1038*** 1051*** 1058*** 1057*** 1056*** 1138*** 1079*** 1139*** 1138***
Robustness test models  with Propositions: Prop(h)….(Equation 2)
LL(M2)° Prop (1)° Prop(2) Prop(3) Prop(4) Prop(5) Prop(6) Prop(7) Prop(8)
constant -3.25*** -3.23*** -3.48*** -3.39*** -3.39*** -5.72*** -3.36*** -2.85*** -2.85***
-12.37 -12.29 -13.36 -11.62 -11.64 -4.90 -12.94 -7.38 -7.37
Exports 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02***
3.35 3.26 4.20 4.64 4.64 4.75 3.65 4.76 4.75
Prop(h) --- 8.74** 286.61 -3.17 -3.13 2.86* 77.25 -2.86* -2.86**
--- 2.54 1.01 -1.07 -1.05 1.98 1.20 -2.00 -1.98
M2(LL) 6.53** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
2.43 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
GDPg 0.97 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97***
66.99 67.77 70.75 70.63 70.61 73.07 71.34 73.11 73.07
Hetero 12.92*** 11.80*** 13.35*** 15.66*** 15.61*** 12.21*** 15.53*** 12.31*** 12.21***
Adj. R² 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Fisher 1095*** 1107*** 1096*** 1098*** 1098*** 1171*** 1114*** 1173*** 1171***
Transmission Channel(s) via LL°(M2)
 Initial Models (Equation 3) Robustness test models(Equation 4)
Prop(2) Prop(3) Prop(4) Prop(6) Prop(2) Prop(3) Prop(4) Prop(6)
constant 0.21*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 0.21*** 0.22*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.22***
13.75 -4.96 -4.96 13.74 14.87 -5.17 -5.18 14.86
Exports -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0004* 0.000 -0.001***
-3.87 1.48 1.42 -3.86 -4.07 1.72 1.67 -4.06
Prop(h) 83.11*** 1.95*** 1.93*** 19.06*** 82.22*** 1.94*** 1.93*** 18.86***
5.04 5.42 5.44 5.04 5.02 5.29 5.31 5.02
GDPpcg -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002*** --- --- --- ---
-2.93 3.67 3.68 -2.96 --- --- --- ---
GDPg --- --- --- --- -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.002***
--- --- --- --- -3.06 3.40 3.40 -3.10
Hetero 2.51 1,99 2.04 2.42 2.12 1.58 1.62 2.04
Adj. R² 0.46 0.40 0.41 0.46 0.47 0.38 0.39 0.47
Fisher 10.10*** 7.64*** 7.69*** 10.10*** 10.39*** 7.07*** 7.13*** 10.39***
°: first difference. *, **, ***:  denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Prop: propositions. GDPpcg: GDP per capita  
growth. GDPg:  GDP growth.  LL (M2):  Liquid Liabilities  on  GDP. Hetero:  Wald  Chi-Square  statistics  for  heteroscedasticity.  Adj.  R²:  
Adjusted Coefficient of determination. Fisher: Fisher statistics.  In transmission channel regressions, LL for propositions 2 and 6 is on level  
data for the sake of model significance. 
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5.2 Trade-off between welfare and growth
Results  on  table  4  suggest  the  decision  between  formal  and  informal  finance  (or 
financial formalization and informalisation/non-formalization) is synonymous to a trade-off 
between  growth and welfare.  While  formal  finance  is  favorable  to  welfare,  it  portrays  a 
negative finance-led-growth nexus. On the contrary, informal and non-formal finance appear 
to diminish welfare but favorable to the finance-led-growth nexus. As a whole, the monetary 
base seems to tie more with formal than informal/non formal finance in the trade-off between 
growth and welfare. 
It  is  important  to  note, these  results  are  only  valid  for  sampled  countries  in  the 
CEMAC region. We argue that for samples where GDP growth rate is higher than population 
growth rate, the thesis for such a trade-off between welfare and growth could be improved. 
Nonetheless,  formal  and  informal  finance  are  diametrically  opposed  and  are  independent 
significant determinants of growth in GDP and per capita.    
5.3 Retrospect to hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Limitation of IMFs financial system definition to formal and semi-formal  
financial sectors14   
Based on our analysis, propositions 3, 4, 7 and 8 have been empirically verified as 
substantial constituents of the financial system as well as significant determinants of growth 
and welfare. 
Hypothesis  2:  The  Monetary  Base  is  not  equal  to  bank  liquid  liabilities  in  developing  
countries15
14 The IMF definition of the financial system is limited to the formal and semi-formal (non-formal) sectors; that 
is  deposits  money banks and other  financial  institutions (see lines  24, 25 and 45 of  International  Financial  
Statistics, October 2008). While this could be quasi true for developed countries, this definition hold less ground 
in developing and underdeveloped worlds where, the informal financial sector takes a toll on the financial system 
and plays an important role in economic growth and development.
15 Contrary to mainstream literature, in developing countries money in circulation plus transaction and account  
deposits (M2) is not equal to liquid liabilities. This suggests that, equating financial depth to liquid liabilities 
would be synonymous to assuming the in-existence and/or insignificance of non-formal and informal financial 
sectors. Money in circulation withheld by the informal and non-formal financial sectors does not always transit  
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Non-formal and informal liquid liabilities are equally relevant in developing countries; 
as currency is significantly held by non-banking sectors as well. This is evident from results 
or correlation analysis on table 2.  From a more detailed perspective, regression coefficients 
from table  4  seem to  suggest  that,  equation  of  bank  sector  liquidity  liabilities  to  M2 in 
developing countries only dilutes the finance effect on growth(‘-8.50+6.29’ for finance-led-
GDP growth and ‘8.74-6.53’ for finance-led-GDP per capita growth). It follows that equating 
formal  banking sector  liquid  liabilities  to  the monetary  base  significantly  undermines  the 
formal banking system elasticity of growth. 
Hypothesis  4:  The  informal  and  non-formal  financial  sectors  are  statistically  significant  
contributions to M2 and economic growth.
Results of table  4 confirm this hypothesis  in supporting that non-banking financial 
sectors are independent significant determinants of the finance-led-growth nexus.
 Hypothesis 5: Understanding competition between financial sectors could be important in  
policy-orientation.
 For  sampled  countries  under  investigation,  the  trade-offs  between  one  form  of 
financial sector with another(absolute measures); as well as growth of one form at the expense 
of the other and vice-versa (relative indicators), could significantly affect policy orientation in 
matters related to growth and welfare. 
6. Conclusion
Financial development indicators are often applied to countries/regions without taking 
into account  specific  financial  development realities.  Financial  depth in the perspective of 
monetary base is not equal to liquid liabilities in every development context.  This paper has 
introduced complementary indicators  to  the existing  Financial  Development  and Structure 
Database (FDSD). These new measures can easily be computed from the FDSD.
through the banking system. Therefore such currency cannot be considered as bank sector deposits or liquid 
liabilities.
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When all financial sectors are taking into account in the definition and usage of liquid 
liabilities: (1) the formal and non-formal/informal financial sectors are inherently mutually 
antagonistic  and should not be assimilated to the monetary base ; (2) equating formal banking 
system liquid liabilities to monetary base significantly undermines the formal banking system 
elasticity  of  growth;  (3)  there  is  a  trade-off  between  growth  and  welfare  depending  on 
financial  sectors;  (4) non-formal and informal financial  sectors are independent significant 
determinants of growth and welfare.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Correlation Analysis 
Xgdp GDPg GDPpcg LL(M2) Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8
1.00 0.12 0.16 -0.23 -0.49 0.11 0.30 0.30 -0.63 0.10 0.63 0.63 Xgdp
1.00 0.99 -0.32 -0.29 -0.12 -0.002 -0.009 -0.12 -0.12 0.12 0.12 GDPg
1.00 -0.31 -0.30 -0.13 0.006 -0.002 -0.14 -0.13 0.15 0.14 GDPpcg
1.00 0.85 -0.32 0.26 0.24 0.29 -0.32 -0.27 -0.29 LL(M2)
1.00 -0.41 -0.28 -0.30 0.74 -0.14 -0.73 -0.74 Prop.1
1.00 -0.33 -0.28 0.08 0.99 -0.12 -0.08 Prop.2
1.00 0.99 -0.82 -0.38 0.84 0.82 Prop.3
1.00 -0.84 -0.32 0.85 0.84 Prop.4
1.00 0.08 -0.99 -1.00 Prop.5
1.00 -0.13 -0.08 Prop.6
1.00 0.99 Prop.7
1.00 Prop.8
Xgdp: Exports; GDPg:GDP growth; GDPpcg: GDP per capita growth; LL(M2): Liquid Liabilities on GDP; Prop.1:Proposition 1; Prop.2: 
Proposition 2; Prop.3:Proposition 3; Prop.4:Proposition 4; Prop.5:Proposition 5 ; Prop.6 : Proposition 6 ; Prop.7 :Proposition 7 ; Prop.8 ; 
Proposition 8. 
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